Conscience As It Relates To Natural Religion: An Analysis of John Henry Newman

In Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford Between A.D. 1826 and 1843 (15S) and An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (GA), John Henry Newman compares natural religion to that of revealed religion in an apologia of faith. I will provide an overview of his definition of natural religion including how it changes over the course of his writings. I will then argue that the faculty of conscience is the common thread that holds his definition of natural religion together between the two works. Lastly, I will explore whether conscience is sufficient to keep Newman’s definition of natural religion coherent within his argument for revealed religion.

In “Sermon II: The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively” (15S), Newman attempts to show how Christianity as authenticated, revealed religion relates to natural religion. He starts by claiming that, “No people (to speak in general terms) has been denied revelation from God …” He says that only a portion of the world; however, enjoy authenticated revelation, which refers to the Christian God of the Gospels. He then introduces a definition of natural religion as an attainable creed that arises from this general revelation evidenced by the writings of pious men from what he calls the heathen world. This is still too general a definition for his purposes but he must get past some of the prima facie objections that the term “Natural Religion” carried with it in the eighteenth century. It is here that he introduces conscience as an obvious and essential principle of religion. Conscience allows an understanding of the difference in the nature of action and motivates one to act in one way over another. Happiness begins to be associated with acting in favor of conscience because we vaguely feel remorse when we act against it. The idea of evil is also associated with the feeling of acting against conscience and together with general revelation, a presentiment of life after death and judgment of our deeds begins to form. Happiness is then connected with right action, which then becomes the basis of an individual moral system. From here, a disciplined mind might develop a religious creed that points to the individual’s idea of moral truth. Keep in mind that the source of the religious creed arose out of conscience but even though it may be built from there on the principles of logic and observations of nature, it remains problematic.

Newman claims that this is how natural, religious creed is attained; however, is not truly attained because others reach different conclusions pointing in a different direction of moral “truth”. The mind may go in the direction of philosophy, which would make the religious creed too abstract, or it may go in the direction of rude natural feeling, which would make the religious creed unintelligible. What seems to be lacking in natural religion is an insight into God’s true personality and a doctrine for moral action that points in the direction genuine moral truth. Authenticated or revealed religion provides this deficiency. Natural religion allows for deep and true religious feeling but with an object to place affections and a standard by which all can gauge moral action. Revealed religion provides the unity of a “Judge and Governor” to keep any corruption of reasoning in check. A large portion of his work is how reason functions in relation to faith, which is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is important to note that natural religion relies more on obedience to moral principles by reasoning alone while teaching religious truth by investigation. Revealed religion enforces obedience more on faith and teaches religious truth historically. Revealed religion engages the faculty of faith, indeed all of our faculties more completely, and as such, it fulfills our nature in a way that natural religion is never able achieve. From Fifteen Sermons, the crucial point to remember is that natural religion prepares the mind for the moral truth and recommends doctrine that revealed religion brings.

It is interesting that the definition of natural religion depends, in a large part, on the definition of revealed religion. This works well in supporting his argument that there is a relationship between the two but I will now discuss how Newman’s definition for natural religion changed over the next 20-40 years as evidenced in A Grammar of Assent. In “Chapter Five: Apprehension and Assent in the Matter of Religion” (GA), Newman considers the dogmas of belief in one God, the Holy Trinity, and dogmatic theology in addition to their relation to notional and real assent. He claims that it is natural to associate empirical evidence of nature with an individual outside of our senses. He then claims that God indirectly gives us through our conscience an insight to His nature. This is the first departure from how he postulated conscience as a starting point for natural religion in Fifteen Sermons. Now he argues that revelation works through conscience rather than as a separate phenomenon. Further, he refers to a child’s response to conscience and states, “The child keenly understands that there is a difference between right and wrong; and when he has done what he believes to be wrong, he is conscious that he is offending the One to whom he is amenable, whom he does not see, who sees him. His mind reaches forward with a strong presentiment to the thought of a Moral Governor, sovereign over him, mindful, and just.” This is another departure from his argument in Fifteen Sermons because he is now claiming that conscience more directly leads to the truth of revealed religion versus a process that requires introduction to the doctrine and truth of the Holy Bible. Lastly, he implies in §1 “Belief in One God” of the same chapter that natural religion relates to notional assent. In his introductory comments, he distinguishes between real and notional assent by associating religious acts with real assent and theological acts with notional. This entails that natural religion is a theological or an intellectual endeavor and therefore more abstract. Here again, he generalizes natural religion into one category of the abstract versus into two categories of abstract or rude natural feeling that arise from the development of a religious creed as posited in Fifteen Sermons.

The differences between the definition of natural religion in Fifteen Sermons and Grammar of Assent may be subtle but I argue that it is significant enough to require a defense of its coherency. My claim is that there may be contextual differences that are explanatory to the differences. Fifteen Sermons fits within the context of a sermon while Grammar of Assent is a philosophical treatise defending Catholic faith. It is beyond the scope of this essay to more fully detail why there are differences in his definition but I argue instead that the faculty of conscience lends support to the coherency of his conceptualization. Since I developed the role of conscience in Fifteen Sermons, I will now focus on Newman’s concept of conscience in Grammar of Assent to support my claim.

In §1 of Chapter 5 (GA), Newman first addresses conscience as mentioned above. He then expands on his definition of conscience along the same lines from Fifteen Sermons in addition to claiming its legitimacy alongside memory, reasoning, and imagination. Further, he discusses the consequences of conscience, which are a moral sense and a sense of duty. This is in line with how he previously conceptualizes the essence of natural religion in Fifteen Sermons. Remember that conscience allows a moral system to develop or be a consequent from the vague apprehension of right and wrong. He asks us to consider conscience as, “ … not as a rule of conduct, but as a sanction of right conduct. This is its primary and most authoritative aspect.” He expands here on his original definition again by discerning conscience from taste and claiming that conscience concerns itself primarily with people and the actions of people or with the self and actions of the self. According to Newman, taste relates more to aesthetic preferences for beauty and ugliness rather than the rightness or wrongness of action. The important point is that his definition so far remains coherent concerning the faculty of conscience between the two works. Lastly, he adds to the definition of conscience by stating, “… when the conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart … constitute a specific difference between conscience and other intellectual senses … indeed they would also constitute between conscience and moral sense…” The disconnect between the concept of natural religion in Fifteen Sermons contrasted with Grammar of Assent becomes less incoherent when attention is focused on the faculty of conscience. The idea of what natural religion is and how conscience relates to it must arguably be teased apart more in Grammar of Assent; however, the same structure of natural religion is apparent when evaluated as a consequent of conscience. The disconnect then may be attributed to contextual differences and sheer length of time between the two works. His conceptualization of conscience evolved over the course of years but the primary function, definition, and relationship to natural religion remains the same.

The question remains whether conscience is a sufficient explanation to maintain coherency and therefore validity of his argument distinguishing natural from revealed religion. Although I argue that conscience supports a claim of coherency between the two definitions, it is not sufficient to completely define natural religion because of his appeal to revealed religion. This is the inherent weakness of his argument in that he defines, in a large part, what natural religion by what is not. For Newman to provide a stronger argument for a relationship between natural and revealed religion he would have to better define natural religion on its own. Secondly, he minimizes religions that have similar agency and doctrine as the Judeo/Christian system. He does refer to Islamic faith as false against the argument that it is also a revealed religion in “Chapter 10: Inference and Assent in the Matter of Religion” (GA); however, it not sufficient to say that one religion is natural while another is revealed simply because the tenets are different. His argument for revealed religion as a logical consequent of natural religion, which is a logical consequent of conscience, rests upon structure. He must therefore focus on the differences in structure between different religious creeds to distinguish Judeo/Christian faith from all others. I argue that the phenomenon of conscience supports a theistic worldview in that it seems to point in the direction of moral truth without proof. This implies, as Newman would agree, that there is something intangible and objective outside of ourselves. It is only a small leap from here to entail theism. I also argue in conclusion that more work to Newman’s argument must be made before Christianity can truly claim itself to be authenticated, revealed religion. Conscience as the starting point may yet provide an argument to better support his claim.

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part IV

Part III lists all questions and comments raised to date from original posts and replies in Part I and II. So far, Dr. Jason Epps, my friend and colleague (hopefully to remain as such), has been the only person to pose such responses; therefore, my comments and questions are directed mostly to what I discern to be his position favoring Creationism over the claims of science concerning evolution. I will provide a brief treatment of epistemological issues raised thus far and then speak, mostly by reference, to some science questions raised.

The Distinction between Science and Faith
So far, the attempt has been made to place science and faith on the same playing field regarding what kind of knowledge they provide and the manner in which belief functions. In other words, the claim is that faith is ultimately common to both science and faith. Respectively, this is both simplistic and fallacious. There is not just one category of belief nor is there just one form of knowledge. Belief in God, belief that I will be killed if I play on the freeway, belief that I am not just a brain in a vat, and belief in the Big Bang Theory of the Universe are different categories of belief that provide different types of knowledge. I am not saying anything new here; many epistemologists have recognized this for centuries. For a more complete treatment of this idea, one may refer to an introductory text in epistemology such as Morton’s Theory of Knowledge (2002). If you would like a theological treatment of faith, reason, inference, and assent you may refer to Cardinal John Henry Newman’s A Grammar in Aid of Assent (1870). Newman’s work is especially relevant regarding the difference between inference and faith.

In regards to science, inference is used to make claims that have yet to be empirically proven. For example, the Big Bang Theory was inferred from the observation that the universe seems to be expanding. The inference is that if the visible universe is currently expanding then it was smaller in the past. Taken back far enough the inference leads to an extremely dense, hot singularity and an event that is known as the Big Bang. This is not faith. It is based on observations that can be replicated. Inference is more flexible to revision than faith because new observations are a different kind of evidence than what faith may require for change. Reason and observation are all that is required to produce an inference. Faith is much more complex and requires intuition and affect in addition to reason. Faith, unlike inference, does not always require direct observation. Another difference between inference and faith is that faith is not simply a belief; it requires volition of action for coherency. Inference, unlike faith, may never affect daily life. Quite simply, faith points to a different kind of truth and knowledge than inference points to associated with science. So, if one is truly interested in discovering truth, the choices after appeal to or replication of observations become:

1. Deny the observations that lead to inference because of difficulties associated with empiricism.
2. Offer an alternative inference. This leads to the formulation of a theory that may be tested to either reject or refine that theory.

Option (1) is problematic because if you reject all observation and experience then one may fall into deep skepticism, which should also apply to one’s own position and leads nowhere meaningful. Skepticism helps keep claims to knowledge rigorous but when taken too far, like most things, is not helpful or practical. Therefore, the question then becomes what observations are reasonable to accept in propositions and inference. Who decides what to accept and what to reject? My observation of the Creationist position, thus far, is that observations that lend support to a position contrary to their own or that supports a theory with implications contrary to their own is many times rejected outright. Does this aid in the search for objective knowable truth or is it simply easier to ignore the tough questions that entail from observations of the physical world?

I think Option (2) is much more interesting and at the heart of what any debate related to coherency should address. The problem, however, still comes back to the demarcation problem. There are exceptions and some difficulties with verifiability and testability but these two qualities seem to provide what Creationism and I.D. do not. If one infers God, is one still practicing science? Maybe yes but on only two questions related to prima causa:

1. How did matter come into existence in the first place?
2. How did the first nucleotide or lipid necessary for even a simple Eukaryotic cell come into existence in the first place?

After those first two moments in time (and maybe not even then), no appeal to God, the supernatural, or anything non-naturalistic should be made for it remain science. Why? Because science and religion serve two separate, distinct functions in human society and are categorically different, not opposing ends of a spectrum. To change science or religion to function in a similar manner as the other defeats the type of knowledge that may be discovered from its distinct, respective position. I simply do not understand why many (but not all) in the religious community want them to be the same thing. If they are the same, do the same epistemological difficulties apply to their position as well? Some argue that the push to get science and religion on the same playing field is part of a larger sociopolitical agenda to get prayer back into the classroom at the expense of all that we have gained over the last 300 years. It is easy to see why when you have action plans such as the Wedge Strategy associated with Philip Johnson, author of Darwin on Trial. One of the purposes of this blog is to explore the characteristics that make science distinct so I encourage asking the tough question of “What is Science?” and posting what qualities you feel science should possess that are distinct from religion. Also, check out the websites for the Center for Scientific Creation and The Discovery Institute to make up your own mind on the larger issue of evolution … just don’t look for many citations without a last name of Behe, Dembski, or Meyer.

A Few Replies and a Comment on Science
I must begin by stating that this exercise has shown me how much more science I need to learn. I have 3 years of Biochemistry, 1 year of Physics, 1 year of Genetics, 2 quarters of Zoology, 1 semester of Philosophy of Genetics, and 1 semester of Science & Society under my belt (all college level). I am also a big fan of the History Channel, Animal Planet, TLC, and the Discovery Channel. Lastly, I have read a decent amount of hard science on my own including Brian Greene’s Elegant Universe, Michio Kaku’s Parallel Worlds, Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History in Time and Universe in a Nutshell. I am not listing this to brag; my purpose is actually quite the contrary. The type of knowledge science provides is so vast that to answer all the specific questions in a particular field is rather difficult and upon reflection, I should have done more to increase my knowledge of the natural world to be able to more eloquently answer the questions posed in this blog. As such and in regards to the questions of evolution and other scientific questions raised, I recommend checking out and defer to TalkOrigins because they provide answers to these types of questions and more with many citations to source materials. They respond to but do not present Creationist or I.D. positions but provide numerous links to alternative views including Creationism and I.D. websites here. As with any Internet resource, be skeptical and judge for yourself. I have a few replies to specific questions and comments raised so far.

*** “Big Bang theory posits that at some point, there was nothing that somehow became something.” ***
This misrepresents the theory. The inference for the theory leads back to an extremely dense, hot singularity. This allows for many things including a cyclical beginning and end to the universe due to black holes or God. Stephen Hawking and Brian Greene do not posit the idea of something from nothing. Neither my physics book nor anything I researched on the web claimed something from nothing either. I am interested in a citation for your claim. Hawking and Greene do acknowledge the difficulty of the prima causa for creation of matter in purely naturalistic terms.

*** “When has “mutability” been observed?” ***
See TalkOrigins on Five Major Misconceptions about Evolution regarding direct and indirect evidence observable in the here and now. Any basic biology or evolutionary biology text should also provide examples.

*** “There is still no observable evidence for transmutability. I would challenge anyone reading this blog to produce it. If you can’t produce it, then you have to concede that there is a significant measure of “faith” that is involved in accepting evolution – as much as it might hurt to admit it :0) ” ***
Once again, either you are rejecting the abundance of observations that lead to this inference or you are not doing your homework. Many transitional fossils have been found that lend support to an inference of transmutability between species and genera, between families, genera, and classes, and between kingdoms and phyla. Check out the TalkOrigins link here for a brief treatment regarding such evidence. I also suggest reading the full article entitled Transitional Vertebrates Fossils FAQ. Your challenge has been produced, no concessions to faith given, and no hurt felt, thank you very much. Do you claim that all these observations are a hoax or do not exist? If not, what inferences would you make with the data? I highly recommend checking this section out because it addresses the misconception of extreme transmutability that has been raised such as transmutation of a frog to a cow or fish to a man. I found the idea fascinating that such extreme mutability is actually evidence against evolution.

A few more questions:
1. What is an evolutionist? If I believe in coherency between faith and religion, what is my label? How would one categorize Francis Collins? He is Director of the Human Genome Project and Evangelical Christian. He believes that evolution is not only real but also evidence of God.

2. How can evolution be coherent with the idea of Biblical inerrancy? Is the Bible a guide to the physical, spiritual, or both? If it is a physical guide then how does it help answer modern questions of medicine, biology, or physics that were inconceivable roughly 2000 years ago?

3. If the message of the Bible refers to an immaterial soul, how are morality and meaning affected by evolution, a material process?

4. What specifically does treatment of science with epistemological integrity look like or entail?

5. What are the 700 dissenters who claim, “We are skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life? Careful examination of the evidence for Darwinian theory should be encouraged.” actually saying? It does not seem to denounce evolution but calls for skepticism and careful examination of evidence, which no scientist would (or should) disagree. See Jason’s blog on the subject here for the specific document.

I appreciate the comments and questions so far. I think Socrates had it right when he argued that the way to truth involves pursuing thought in many directions and to follow out logical implications of thought. It makes us uncomfortable to challenge our own positions but drives those who truly seek truth to continue to work and discover. I do not understand how Creationism or I.D. allows for the possibility of further work to discover the many unanswered questions; however, I am open (and still waiting) for answers to analytically evaluate. Only in this way may objective truth may be discovered and therefore become knowable.

As always, respectful comments are encouraged.

Best Wishes,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part III

Here are all of the questions and comments raised in Part I and II. If I missed anything, it was not my intent. Please leave a post detailing any errors so I may update.

Questions Raised to Date

1. Are strict adherents to either side interested in civil conversation?

2. Should the debate be under the label of “science”? Why or why not?

3. How is science defined?

4. How does Intelligent Design not fall prey to a regress that concludes with an entity we traditionally define as God?

5. What does a basic definition of evolution need to consist of?

6. Does this definition go beyond Darwin's understanding in "Origin?”

7. How many dissenters of the theory constitute a significant amount?

8. What do you mean by "accredited scientist”?

9. If the dissenters of the theory from #7 above make a supernatural conclusion, are they still practicing science?

10. Who has the burden of proof and why?

11. Is the burden of proof to show that evolution or intelligent design or creation is right, wrong, or that one is science and that one is not?

12. If the moral and Biblical implications of evolution are intolerable to so many of faith, is reconciliation, debate, coherency, or any other unifying word even possible?

13. Big Bang theory posits that at some point, there was nothing that somehow became something. Why is it that this belief considered science when it is plainly not naturalistic or empirically observed?

14. When has “mutability” been observed? Variation within species has certainly been observed, but when has “transmutation?” If we haven’t then why refer to this as science? If you can’t observe it in the present, in a lab for example, doesn’t that case to be science? Or does that line of reasoning apply only to those who believe in God?

15. How many evolutionists would adhere to the recent finding that the universe had a beginning?

Comments and Difficulties Raised to Date

A. Certain words and concepts need to be clearly and concisely defined if any productive conversation is to take place.

B. There needs to be a clear-cut statement of belief for Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design.

C. Science should be systematic and not appeal to supernatural causation.

D. Religion and science, once you carry them back far enough, are both based upon faith.

E. Just as religion, science is based upon ultimate foundations that cannot be empirically verified.

F. The debate should not be under the label of “science” because I.D. and Creationism appeal to the supernatural and lack a methodology for further research. It would be acceptable for the debate to be under Philosophy, Sociology, or Education.

G. Current mainstream science appeals to the supernatural just as much as creation science does. If it did not, it would have no foundation upon which to rest its evolutionary conclusions.

H. Intelligent Design is equivalent to God and is simply a tactic around the Supreme Court ban on the teaching of Creationism in public schools.

I. Related to # 4 above. A regress presupposes that the ultimate Intelligent Designer is subject to the natural order that He created and exists outside of. This is illogical. God created the physical order of things that includes reason, logic, time, space, and laws. The idea that a creation must have a Creator is valid in the order that God created but it makes little sense to suppose that He is subject to rules that He created for a reality where He does not primarily “reside.”

J. There is still no observable evidence for transmutability. If evidence cannot be provided then there is a significant measure of “faith” that is involved in accepting evolution.

K. “That evolution is” versus “how evolution is” are two separate questions.

L. Under 1% of working earth and life scientists in the United States dissent with the theory of evolution.

M. Majority has absolutely nothing to do with truth. Most people thought Galileo was an idiot but the overwhelming majority was overwhelmingly wrong.

N. Related to L above. These are two different studies. You are committing a fallacy by combining the two to draw a conclusion. Your conclusion implies that the 700 dissenting scientists are the ONLY scientists who disagree of question the “absoluteness” of evolutionary theory.

O. Let’s make sure science treats its subjects with epistemological integrity.

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part II

The following is a comment I made 5/31/2008 to the post "The Coherency of Evolution and Faith"(5/29/2008). It was requested that I make this its own post so as requested ....

Upon reflection on this issue, I believe many related questions must be answered to even envision what the debate should look like so I’m going to ask a few of those questions and leave the first substantive commentary to Mario (or anyone else for that matter). These are in no particular order.

1. Should the debate be under the label of “science”? If you think yes, then why? If you think, no then under what label and why?

2. Can someone please outline an argument for me how Intelligent Design does not fall prey to a regress that concludes with an entity we traditionally define as God?

3. The following is a basic definition that I pulled from Wikipedia (5/30/2008): “In biology, evolution is the process of change in the inherited traits of a population of organisms from one generation to the next. The genes that are passed on to an organism's offspring produce the inherited traits that are the basis of evolution. Mutations in genes can produce new or altered traits in individuals, resulting in the appearance of heritable differences between organisms, but new traits also come from the transfer of genes between populations, as in migration, or between species, in horizontal gene transfer. In species that reproduce sexually, new combinations of genes are produced by genetic recombination, which can increase the variation in traits between organisms. Evolution occurs when these heritable differences become more common or rare in a population.”

I used Wikipedia because it seems to be a basic source for basic definitions and nothing in this definition seems out of line with my understanding of the basic tenants of the theory. What more is required for a meaningful debate to take place?

4. If there are 480,000 accredited, University affiliated earth and life scientists working in the United States alone, how many dissenters of the theory constitute a significant amount?

5. If the dissenters of the theory from #4 above make a supernatural conclusion, are they still practicing science?

6. Who has burden of proof and why?

7. If the moral and Biblical implications of evolution (regardless of the observations, inferences, or argument) are intolerable to so many of faith, is reconciliation, debate, coherency, or any other unifying word even possible?

I hope we get some meaningful dialogue to answer these and many more to come. I will try to work out my answers to my own questions … unless Battlestar Galactica is on, of course.

Cheers,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part I

If we assume that evolutionary theory points to a certain kind of truth and that faith also points to a certain kind of truth then it is only logical that there must be a certain kind of coherency between the theory of evolution and faith. Naturalism as a metaphysical worldview versus God seems to be the boiled-down, line-in-the-sand issue, not mutability of species as the basic, basic tenant of evolutionary theory. Too bad we couldn’t put representatives from both camps in a cage match, let them fight it out, and be done with the conflict, bickering, name-calling, hypocrisy, and tactics that take place on both sides of the fence. Since we cannot do a cage match … as cool as that might be … what would it take from both sides to resolve this debate? Maybe all I can hope for in this post is formulation of questions that must be answered before resolution can be achieved but I am truly interested in thoughtful, respectful solutions.

So … what do you think?

Best Wishes,
Roger

Agnosticism and Coherent Belief

The problem of divine hiddenness attempts to answer the question of God’s existence in the absence of direct evidence. One of the first philosophers to formulate the problem was Saint Anselm of Canterbury in the 11^th century but it was J.L. Schellenberg who revitalized the debate in 1993 with the following argument:

1. If there is a God, He is perfectly loving.
2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. No perfectly loving God exists.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.[1]

In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (2002), editors Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser present arguments from various philosophers and theologians that respond to the problem of divine hiddenness and Schellenberg’s claim. Paul Draper, one of the authors from the collection, responds from an Agnostic viewpoint with the following argument:

1. There is no direct evidence of God.
2. There is evidence that supports theism over naturalism.
3. There is evidence that supports naturalism over theism.
4. Comparative strength of the evidence cannot be determined.
5. Suspension of belief is justified when it is not clear which side is supported by stronger evidence.
6. Therefore, suspension of belief in God’s existence is justified.[2]

Schellenberg’s argument is problematic for Draper because, according to Schellenberg, reasonable non-belief supports the denial of God’s existence, not justified suspension of belief.

Draper’s argument distinguishes itself from both atheism and theism as a distinct point, not a point on a dichotomous spectrum. Theism and atheism support a metaphysical position in that God’s existence or naturalism respectively explains the ultimate nature of being and the world. Draper’s formulation of the agnostic position does not support a metaphysical but an epistemically uncertain position. This epistemic position holds in balance both evidential arguments in support of theism and those in support of naturalism. This is not to say that evidence supporting the existence of God and the evidence supporting naturalism both have a value of .5 but only that the relative weights of the evidence cannot be determined. Since the comparative strength of the evidence is unclear, agnostics make no metaphysical claim. From the agnostic viewpoint, either God or naturalism may be explanatory to the nature of the universe but no conclusion from individual evidence, at least at this time, is possible. This is clearly different from the Schellenberg’s reasonable nonbeliever because the nonbeliever still makes some metaphysical claim concerning God’s existence.[3]

Schellenberg represents the agnostic position in two different ways, neither of which represents agnosticism in quite the same way as Draper intends. First, Schellenberg represents one type of agnostic as weighing the evidence in support of the existence of God as equivalent to a probability of .5 against the evidence supporting the nonexistence of God.[4] This would lend support to his argument; however, as mentioned above, this is clearly not representative of Draper’s formulation in that a measure of probability is impossible because the relative weights are indeterminable. Secondly, Schellenberg represents another type of agnostic who argues against the atheist conclusion and claims that there is no way of telling what the evidence shows.[5] This may seem to be the same position that Draper takes but there is a distinct difference between the two. The agnostic, as Schellenberg describes, would not be able to defeat the atheist because to do so requires a defeater that would entail at least some theistic belief. According to Schellenberg, this is out of line with the agnostic position because holding to an atheistic defeater that theism provides is “confused” so atheism wins out either by the lack of a defeater or incoherence. Schellenberg would be correct if Draper took a metaphysical position but again, he holds to an epistemic position that is, by definition, without theistic or atheistic defeaters. Defeaters entail some conclusion of the evidence that Draper finds impossible to discern. For example, 20^th century cosmology may support theism but that does not entail a conclusion that cosmology is evidence of theism.[6] Only if Draper made such a conclusion could he use that as a defeater against atheism. This has already been shown to be incoherent. Therefore, an agnostic must defend the agnostic position of epistemic uncertainty, not a particular conclusion of either theism or atheism against the opposing side. Atheism and theism both support a conclusion as their positions. How can an argument concerning a truth claim of atheism over agnosticism ever be meaningful if the agnostic does not make a truth claim? As long as Draper and other agnostics remember this key point, they will withstand Schellenberg’s claim that agnosticism really is just support for atheism and maintain agnosticism as a unique, distinct position that is not along a spectrum between atheism and theism. In this sense, an argument of the type Schellenberg described between the atheist and the agnostic would never happen and is not valid support of his claim.

According to Draper, it is both coherent and necessary that an agnostic engage in certain religious practices such as prayer because as he stated, “… unlike an atheist, I believe there just might be a God listening.”[7] This may seem like a contradiction related to the argument detailed above; however, action is distinct from belief and the agnostic position would preclude certain religious and atheistic activities that required a certain kind of faith. Faith requires belief and for the agnostic, belief only goes as far as knowledge that one of two possibilities must be true. Faith for the agnostic then must be limited within the scope of this belief. As it concerns theism and atheism, let us say that prayer, attending church, or not doing either (atheism) are first order activities while accepting a religious post, serving a mission or volunteering to speak out against religion (atheism) are second order. The distinction between first and second order activities is the level of faith necessary to not create a contradiction with the activity. If one is seeking or allowing for the possibility of theism, any first order religious activity is justified while no second order activity could possibly be justified. The same may be said of atheistic activities but it is simpler to classify because first order atheist activities involve no action while second order atheist activities involve some form of activism that either promotes atheism or speaks out against theism. Both of the latter are clearly not in line with the agnostic position but inaction is coherent with the agnostic position because of the possibility that God does not exist. Agnostic practice is a problem for Schellenberg because a person of reasonable nonbelief could not perform religious activities without contradiction. It is here that the distinction is made between Draper and Schellenberg’s nonbeliever because of Draper’s lack of contradiction in regards to holding both possibilities within an epistemically uncertain position.

In his essay, “Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic” Draper responds directly to Schellenberg in the following way:

1. “A theist might counter that ambiguous evidence … is actually evidence for theism.”[8]
2. “… ambiguous evidence has other implications besides reasonable nonbelief … it makes theistic practice possible.”[9]
3. “ … let’s assume that ambiguous evidence is much more likely on naturalism … so is strong evidence supporting naturalism … Does it follow that my agnostic stance is unstable? Again, the answer is ‘no’. The answer would be ‘yes’ if it could be shown that, prior … naturalism and theism are equally probable.”[10]

Draper’s response is problematic on (1) an (2) because he somewhat appeals to theism to counterbalance Schellenberg. He does eventually revert to and justify suspension of judgment based on ambiguous evidence along with inability to weigh opposing support (3); however, as mentioned above, it is important that the agnostic respond solely from the agnostic position. To answer the problem of agnostic instability from a theistic position to counter Schellenberg only strengthens the theist claim. He concludes by rightly defending the agnostic position in (3) showing that prior assumption cannot be made concerning the probability of naturalism or theism. Further defense of the agnostic position by Draper should include a discussion of assumptions made by both camps that lend support to their respective claims. Arguably, one of the strengths of the agnostic position is the lack of assumptions it holds in regards to evidence used to support its position. It could even be said that agnosticism makes no assumptions because it makes no metaphysical truth claim.

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[1] J.L. Schellenberg. “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A Collaborative Discussion.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Moser, Paul K., 33-61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[2] Paul Draper. “Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic.” in Divine Hiddenness, 197-214.

[3] Schellenberg distinguishes between the inculpable non-believer who does not believe in the existence of God through no fault of her own and that of the culpable believer who may be stubbornly blind to divine evidence. See Divine Hiddenness, 43.

[4] J.L. Schellenberg. “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A Collaborative Discussion.” in Divine Hiddenness, 55.

[5] Ibid, 56.

[6] Paul Draper. “Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic.” in Divine Hiddenness, 201.

[7] Ibid, 210.

[8] Ibid, 209.

[9] Ibid, 210.

[10] Ibid.

The Problem of Evil and Soul-Making

I wrote the following essay for my Philosophy of Religion class at the University of Utah. The more I learn, the more I realize my ignorance. I believe my professor provided feedback on my argument and not on any of my theological claims. Any comments on these claims relating to Christianity and/or the Bible would be appreciated.

The problem of evil relates to a prima facie contradiction between the existence of evil or suffering and the existence of God. The answer to the problem of evil usually entails differentiating definitions of the terms evil, benevolence, and omnipotence along with a conclusion of the existence or non-existence of God. Theodicists defend the existence of God and sometimes use the problem of evil to justify their theistic claims. Philosopher John Hick is such a theodicist and contributed greatly to the debate with his book Evil and the God of Love.[1] Hick attempts to justify the existence of evil by claiming that it allows for moral development or soul-making and is therefore in line with the existence of God.[2] Soul-making then is a greater good than the absence of evil and justifies evil as part of God’s design of the world. The basic deductive argument as it relates to the problem of evil is as following:

1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. God knows when and where evil exists.
4. God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. Therefore, God does not exist.

Christian theology rests on premise (1) and therefore refutation of the atheistic conclusion (6) relies on resolving a contradiction between premises (2) through (5) based on traditional definitions of omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, and evil. Philosophers and theodicists have disagreed with these traditional definitions and reformulated the premises to support the existence of God. For example, Nelson Pike redefines the benevolence of God to allow evil only if there is a morally sufficient reason for evil or suffering.[3] Pike further proposes that evil may exist in the best of all possible worlds thereby eliminating contradiction. Roderick Chisholm added to the idea of evil’s existence in the best of all possible worlds by claiming that evil can (and must) be defeated in order to contradict (6).[4] Terence Penelhum questioned the presupposition inherent in (5) and showed that Christians must be committed to justifying all evils because of the possibility of spiritual benefit that we may not have the epistemic capacity to understand.[5]

John Hick begins his theodicy by acknowledging evolution as an “unavoidable Christian tenet” while maintaining our “spiritualization as a child of God.”[6] He rejects the presupposition that it is God’s plan is to create a hedonistic paradise common to atheistic arguments and instead uses the analogy of the parent and child to show that God is primarily interested in developing the soul.[7] He proposes that it is more fruitful, in this context, to look to the future rather than the past as it relates to the teleology of the existence of evil. He then distinguishes between physical pain and suffering to show that much of human misery transcends physical pain while anxiety, fear, and remorse are sufferings of the soul.[8] It is here that he proposes that an epistemic distance is necessary for free-will to exist in relation to God. Sinfulness and the value of redemption create a paradox that Hick claims places suffering within divine providence.[9] The key point to his argument is that without evil, there could be no morally correct action because the consequences of any action could never be evil or inflict suffering. Without moral consequence, development of the soul and redemption would never be realized. Being made in His image does not mean comfort and idleness but rather tasks, challenges, and problems. He addresses the problem with the mystery of random, unexplained suffering by suggesting that mystery may be an important part of soul-making as demonstrated by compassion and altruism. He further suggests that the mystery of dysteleological suffering may be beyond human understanding but still may be support for theism by again emphasizing that evil paradoxically allows human goodness within a context of world divinely created for soul-making.[10]

Hick’s soul-making theodicy, at first glance, does seem to overcome the contradictions inherent in the classic problem of evil. However, it has many problems in its formulation and conclusion of God’s existence. First, soul-making theodicy does not adequately account for evolution and our coming into spiritual existence. Hick recognizes that evolution is a fact of nature and his idea of a two-stage process of spiritualization necessarily means that at some point in our development, the hand of God touched us. Being made in his image seems to mean that we had to evolve certain capacities that would allow belief and reason to be possible. In other words, we had to physically evolve a cerebral cortex and higher brain functioning. Was it God’s plan that we evolve in a certain way that allowed only humans to have the capacity of being made in is image? This fits nicely with many tenets in the Book of Genesis but is problematic in terms of evolution even as simple as the Great Chain of Being.[11] If God’s design of our world is to provide us with a physical reality capable of developing our soul, it does not make sense that there would be a need of a two-stage process. God being omnipotent and omniscient of the fact that He was going to make us in His image at some point could just have easily made us according to the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis without the need of an evolutionary process. The uniqueness or specialness of humans in God’s scheme and dominion over all other animals in Christian faith conflicts with evolution in the fact that evolution makes it possible that other creatures might develop cognitive capacities similar to our own and therefore be possible of being made in His image as well.

Secondly, with regards to animals, soul-making theodicy does not adequately account for their suffering. If suffering and evil are necessary for humans who uniquely have a soul that requires developing and God is both omnipotent and omniscient then it is possible that a world could exist where pain, suffering, consequence, and redemption only applied to humans. Hick would respond that pointless evil does not exist because the very mystery of the appearance of pointless suffering allows the possibility of compassion or some other form of human goodness. This does not hold up to the fact we can conceptualize unknown suffering that negates a realistic response of human goodness. How can compassion and altruistic behavior be shown to the animal that gets caught in the La Brea tar pits that no one witnessed slowly, horrifically dying? Redemption and the possibility of human goodness points to the actions we may or may not perform. Any suffering outside the possibility of action or outside the possibility of witness seems to serve no purpose to the process of soul-making and is therefore pointless if humans are the only one of God’s creations that has a soul.

The same reasoning applies to the suffering and evil of mass or innocent human suffering that goes without witness as well. We can imagine an individual without family or friends who dies in a way that not even a corpse or skeleton remain. We can also imagine that this individual died in such a way that their suffering did not contribute to the development of their own soul such as slowly suffocating while in a coma, i.e., no higher brain functioning to realize suffering of say dying alone but enough base functioning to feel physical pain. There does not seem to be either the capacity for human goodness to be demonstrated in the face of the suffering or the ability to reflect on the mystery of the point of suffering that we discover after the fact. If neither is possible then I argue that it is pointless evil and does not fit within Hick’s formulation of a soul-making theodicy without the contradiction of omnipotence, omniscience, or benevolence inherent in the classic problem of evil. In other words, the argument for suffering as teleological in any capacity still falls short regarding evil without benefit to anyone either before or after the suffering even in an environment expressly designed for soul-making.

Lastly, Hick creates a paradox that many theists, particularly those of Christian faith, would find unacceptable. First, assume that God exists and allows suffering for the possibility of morality in our world for the purpose of soul making. Next, assume that Heaven and Hell exist as reward or punishment for the choices we make in this world. Then imagine an individual who because of free-will, faith, and the environment God provides for the development of the soul, chooses a path of moral correctness and earns a place in Heaven. According to Christian doctrine, Heaven is a paradise where conditions are perfect. Then by Hick’s formulation Heaven must either be absent of free-will or morality. Free-will would allow wrong or mistaken action but wrong action is not possible in the paradise of Heaven because conditions are perfect. Further, there seems to be evidence in the Bible that free-will is punishable and evil as demonstrated by some accounts of Lucifer and the Fall. Lastly, to say that Heaven is absent of morality would be heretical to Christian doctrine since God is morally perfect and Heavenly paradise is again, a place where conditions are perfect. If the design of the physical world allows development of the soul, what does the design of Heaven allow regarding free-will, development, and morality?

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[1] Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966 (rev. edn., 1977).

[2] Hick, John. “Soul-Making and Suffering.” In The Problem of Evil, edited by Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M. Adams, 168-188. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Selections include only Chapters 12 and 14 from Evil and the God of Love (rev. edn., 1977).

[3] Pike, Nelson. “Hume on Evil” In The Problem of Evil, p. 41.

[4] Chisholm, Roderick M. “The Defeat of Good and Evil” In The Problem of Evil, p. 68.

[5] Penelhum, Terence. “Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil” In The Problem of Evil, p. 81-82.

[6] Hick, John. “Soul-Making and Suffering.” In The Problem of Evil, p. 168.

[7] Hick, John. “Soul-Making and Suffering.” In The Problem of Evil, pp. 169-171.

[8] Ibid, p. 176.

[9] Ibid, p. 178.

[10] Ibid, p. 188.

[11] The conceptualization of a Great Chain of Being is a Western idea of the medieval period. It is illustrated as a hierarchy with life as a continuum from material to immaterial and inanimate to animate. This basically covered everything from rock to God. Our human existence places us on the on the border of material and immaterial and therefore closest to God.

Aquinas' "Summa Theologica"

Saint Thomas Aquinas. "The Existence of God", 1265-74. In Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 4th ed., edited by John Perry et al., 80-82. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

The Summa Theologica (Question 2, Article 1) responds to Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument as such:
1. Someone hearing the word “God” may believe that God may have a body and not understand it to mean that which nothing greater can be thought.
2. Just because God may be meant to mean that which nothing greater can be thought, it does not entail that He actually exists.

Aquinas then responds to two arguments against the existence of God:
The Problem of Evil
1. God is infinitely powerful (omnipotent).
2. God is infinitely good (benevolent).
3. A benevolent and omnipotent God would not allow evil to exist.
4. Evil exists.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.

Aquinas argues that God is infinitely good and would allow evil only if He could bring good out of evil. The difficulty with this response is the problem of pointless evil. If Bambi is caught in a forest fire that no one witnesses and dies a horrible, painful death then it seems like pointless evil if we define suffering as evil. If animals have no souls, then what good comes from their pain? Unless humans (the only creatures that have souls) either experience or witness suffering, then there can be no test of faith questioning the benevolence of God.

Argument from Naturalism
1. If we can account for something based on a few original causes (prima causa) we should not use many.
2. We can account for everything without appeal to God via naturalism.
3. Therefore, there is no need to say God exists.

We must trace whatever nature does back to a first cause because nature works for a definite end under the direction of a higher agency. This response is also problematic because it begs the question regarding the purpose of nature, direction, and higher agency. Naturalism, by most definitions, seems to exclude supernatural causation.

Aquinas response and argument for the existence of God consists of the Quinquae Viae or the “Five Ways”.
1. The argument from change – objects that have potentiality for change cannot actually change without some other force. Everything that changes is made to change by something else. If we regress this principle to a first cause, we conclude that the first cause is not changed by anything. This is what we understand to be God.
2. The argument from causation – efficient causes come in series and we cannot find anything that is its own efficient cause because that would entail that it came before itself, which is logically impossible. Efficient cause cannot go back to infinity, which means that there is a first efficient cause. This is what we understand to be God.
3. The argument from possibility and necessity – some things can either exist or fail to exist. If something can fail to exist then at some point it has failed to exist. A regress again leads us to conclude that at some point, nothing existed. For something to begin to exist, there must be something that already exists out of necessity. We must therefore conclude that there exists something necessary that does not owe its necessity to anything else but causes the necessity of other things. This is what we understand to be God.
4. The argument from the gradation of things – some things are found to be better, truer, or nobler than others. Something is said to have more or less of a quality according to its distance to its maximum. The greatest thing, according to Aristotle, is the cause of everything of that kind. Therefore, there is something that is the cause of being, goodness, and perfection. This is what we understand to be God.
5. The argument from the governance of the world – all things, even those lacking consciousness, act for a purpose.

Premises 1-3 do not conclusively proof the existence of God over naturalism. One could argue that you can substitute “Big Bang” for “God” in these premises as well. There will always remain, however, the question of where matter came from in the first place when it comes to the Big Bang even if you believe in a cyclical, no loss of matter hypothesis.

Premises 4-5 are problematic if you do not assume the existence of God in the first place. It is hard, once again, to get away from the subjectivism as in Anselm’s argument and his idea of “greater”. If we cannot objectively define “greater” and “lesser” without human convention then this will always be a problem. This is a better argument than Anselm but more is required.

As always, your thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Best Wishes,
Roger

Saint Anselm's "Ontological Argument"

Saint Anselm of Canterbury. "The Ontological Argument", 1077. In Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 4th ed., edited by John Perry et al., 78-79. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

This relates to yet another philosophical project I am tackling this summer. The goal is to read a broad range of introductory readings to provide a more solid base and better speak the language of philosophy. As always, I encourage your thoughts and wisdom.

Anselm’s argument for the existence of God breaks down as such:
1. A being may be imagined which none greater can be conceived.
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone.
3. If we imagine a being that exists only in our mind then it is not a being which none greater can be conceived.
4. A being which none greater can be conceived must also exist in reality.
5. Therefore, God must exist because He is a being which none greater can be conceived.

This argument seems valid but Anselm makes a couple of assumptions that makes me question its soundness. First, there is no proof that existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone (premise 2). Einstein’s theory tells us that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light. It takes light from the sun approximately 9 minutes to reach Earth yet our imagination can take us to the sun instantaneously thereby making our mind more powerful than the limits on matter. In addition, all religious belief entails a belief in some form of dualism because of the immaterial nature of the soul. If we maintain our mind within our soul after we die then the mind is greater than the reality of physical substance. This is problematic for Anselm because premise 2 is key to his argument.

Secondly, Anselm also assumes that there is some sort of inherent value difference between beings that allows us to objectively use the term “greater”. Am I greater than my cat? He lives a plush life, does not have to work, or worry about matters I address in my blog. Maybe our more highly developed cerebral cortex is a curse rather than a blessing. Anselm’s argument does not get off the ground unless someone can show that greatness actually exists.

The last problem with Anselm’s argument has to do with the problem of omnipotence. If God can do anything then He can make a being greater than Himself. It is then conceivable that there is a being greater than God, which allows God not to exist in reality but only in the mind according to Anselm’s argument. This is the weakest and most paradoxical problem of Anselm's argument that again relates to the problem of “greatness”.

I will leave this with a similar paradox and nod to The Simpsons. “Could God microwave a burrito so hot that He could not eat it? Homer can be so deep.

Best Wishes,
Roger