Ethical Issues Surrounding Newborn Medical and Genetic Screening: Project Update

It has been some time since I have written here concerning the UROP project with Professor Tabery. Since I am presenting today at the capital, I thought I'd share this with everyone as well.

Currently, there are over 1,200 tests available to determine the genetic component of various medical disorders, predispositions, and traits. The state of Utah currently mandates that 46 screening tests be performed on all newborns to identify and treat certain disorders. The number of genetic tests will increase in the future, requiring policymakers to make decisions concerning what tests to require, allow, or prohibit. Guidelines for making such decisions require standardized, objective criteria; however, critical analysis of the criteria to justify these decisions is lacking in scientific and public policy literature.

In 1968, Wilson and Jungner were the first to develop criteria for making such decisions. In 2004, the American College of Medical Genetics developed more sophisticated criteria for newborn screening tests. Our analysis found that these criteria either consist of ambiguous language or are insufficient when applied to some current newborn screening tests and some tests for disorders currently being debated for possible mandate. Our research also found that significant variation exists between states related to newborn screening ranging from 17 to 53 mandated tests. Our goal is to provide policymakers with usable guidelines to make informed, ethical decisions for requiring, allowing, or prohibiting newborn screening tests. Our guidelines include two philosophical concepts necessary to make an informed, ethical decision concerning permissibility:

1. Understanding of the causal relationship between genes and disorders. The genetic component must be high in order for the state to consider a newborn screening test mandatory. In addition, the causal relationship between genes and disorders must be morally positive or neutral and free from scientific controversy. All tests within the impermissible category have a significant environmental component or are morally controversial related to causation and/or treatment.
2. Treatability. In order for a test to be mandatory, the treatment must be readily available, of reasonable cost to the parents, and benefit the least advantaged. A test may still be mandated by the state if it does not meet these criteria if and only if it is of significant public health concern and is currently under debate for possible public assistance related to treatment. We name the first category as mandatory-treatable (MT) and the latter as mandatory-informational (MI).
   

The following provides a brief outline of key concepts and arguments that we have developed to support this legislative formula.

The causal relationship between genes and phenotypic traits or disorders is important in the permissibility debate on newborn screening because it relates to a level of confidence medical professionals and patients may place in test results. In the traditional equation for phenotypic expression, P = G + E + (G x E), G must be high and E negligible for any test to be considered mandatory. This means that scientific consensus must conclude that a test have an insignificant environmental (E) component in order to justify mandatory testing and have a high correlation between specific genetic markers and expression of disorder near or at 100%. If there is a high genetic component but expression is not at or near 100%, then it may still be considered MI or permissible. In regards to justifying permissible or impermissible newborn tests, we argue that that the causal understanding of the genetic component may be high or low but are excluded from the mandatory category due treatability factors discussed below. The paradigmatic disorders for both ends of this spectrum include phenylketonuria (PKU) on the mandatory side and anti-social personality disorder (ASPD) on the impermissible side.

Newborn testing of PKU utilizes high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) as part of a tandem mass spectrometry (TMS) panel in most states. This tests for the genetic markers associated with the absence of an enzyme necessary to break down phenylalanine. Without this enzyme, the brain builds up toxic levels of phenylalanine resulting in mental retardation, brain damage, and eventually death. Early detection and a carefully controlled diet free of phenylalanine prevent morbidity and mortality in those individuals with this genetic disorder. The genetic component in this case is 100% with no environmental component in the expression of the disorder. The expression correlation of this disorder is also 100%. If a child is born with the defective gene, he or she will develop the disorder. PKU was the first newborn screening test used in the United States and is part of the mandatory testing program in each of the 50 states.

ASPD is a psychiatric condition symptomatic of behaviors associated with the term "evil" or "predator". The terms "sociopath" and "psychopath" are also sometimes used to describe a person with ASPD. Characteristics of the disorder include deception, violence, criminal acts, lack of empathy, and disregard for social norms. Many with ASPD simply do not seem able to emotionally differentiate or "morally" restrain their actions. Poverty, alcoholism, and drug abuse also are related to ASPD. It is estimated that in the U.S. general population as many as 5.8% of males and 1.2% of females meet the criteria for ASPD while the incidence in U.S. prison populations is anywhere from 50-80%. A genetic test for ASPD has been proposed that determines the markers associated with low levels of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), correlated with ASPD in conjunction with severe childhood maltreatment. The association of ASPD with low levels of MAOA functions off an interactive predisposition model developed and is significantly impacted by the environmental component in expression of the disorder. No states currently require newborn testing of MAOA although its requirement was proposed by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair before the House of Commons in 2005. We argue that screening for this disorder should be impermissible because the high environmental component associated with its expression and the controversy surrounding genes and behavior. The causal component must be understood in consensus with the scientific community to have a genetic component of near 100% and be free from association related to behavior or other moral considerations that are still currently under debate. We believe that testing for ASPD in newborns represents a clear case of a test that should be made impermissible by the state.

Treatability is also important in any decision factoring for mandatory, permissible, or impermissible newborn testing. The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) developed criteria in 2004 that includes scores for availability, cost of treatment, efficacy, and benefits to both the individual and society. We argue that although this is a significant improvement from the ambiguous language used in the Wilson and Jungner criteria, it is still missing an important component related to inequality and social justice. This component derives from philosopher John Rawls’ Difference Principle from his work A Theory of Justice. The Difference Principle states that any system of justice must address the need and indeed benefit the least advantaged within the system. He also argues that even though the system will allow for inequality, it should be minimized at birth so everyone starts with an equal opportunity. This is important to any legislative decision regarding newborn screening because the state should not perpetuate or increase differences between classes of people. In other words, any test that is possible for mandate in the future must be treatable by means of availability, benefit, and cost across all classes of people including the least advantaged. Any newborn test for which treatment perpetuates or increases inequality between classes should be judged impermissible by legislators. Any test that is deemed permissible may involve treatment that is morally neutral or does not promote any type of inequality.

The role of the legislature as it relates to newborn screening must address the needs of public health and rights of the individual. Our formula includes the components of causal understanding of the underlying genetic mechanisms and a universal notion of treatability that follows a theory of justice. This will give legislators the tools to evaluate both current newborn screening tests for possible revision and more importantly, future tests that may not be as paradigmatic as PKU or ASPD. Our formula will also help standardize the number and type of newborn screening tests performed between states so that all American newborns may have a healthy start on life. We believe the newborn screening issue and our proposed solution is both conceptually important and practically necessary in the field of medical ethics.

Harris' "Enhancement Is a Moral Duty"

Harris, John (2007). “Enhancement Is A Moral Duty" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19-35.

Harris attempts to introduce the ethical case for enhancement and the positive future of humankind. He uses five examples to give a sense of the debate and the different objections to the different modes of enhancement.

1. Mechanical versus Chemical Enhancement – he comments on the Boorse and Daniels definition of health to include illness as a departure form normal of species-typical functioning. He then makes the analogy of using glasses to binoculars. One raises sight up to a normal level while the other enhances beyond what is normally capable. He argues that to make an argument against enhancement, one would have to argue against the use of binoculars. He then makes some comparisons to give a sense of the moral debate. Buying a child the best education possible versus giving drugs to reach the same level of intelligence. Riding a bike versus using steroids. It seems the current debate says that the first choice is morally acceptable while the second choices are not. Harris seems to be a bit of a cautionary consequentialist in that if it is safe, then he sees no difference if the results are the same.
2. Disease and Vaccination – he notes that there has been very little resistance to this type of enhancement technology. If we alter human beings to affect their vulnerability to things, we are enhancing them. The issue then with new enhancement technology may be a matter of perception.
3. Genetic Enhancement – he notes David Baltimore's work at Caltech as HIV/AIDS and cancer vaccinations using genetic therapies as an example against "normal or species-typical functioning" against Boorse and Daniels. He further argues against Francis Fukuyama's claim that changes to human nature are absolutely unacceptable. Fukuyama's idea of Factor X, what is left when we strip away all of a person's contingent and accidental characteristics, as human nature is argued by Harris to include enhancement because if Factor X can be preserved or even enhanced then it must be a good thing by Fukuyama's own argument. He then notes that cloning is the only way to preserve the human genome and that universal cloning is the only way to prevent genocide. He notes that you could use Aquinas' Doctrine of Double Effect to argue for enhancement but that it would not be sufficient, again from a consequentialist viewpoint.
4. Chemical Enhancement – Harris favors enhancement as an absolute good and not as a positional good. This means that if we enhance for a longer life, it is good in and unto itself, not as an improvement to others even though other that do not have this good may not live as long. Making lives better rather making lives better than others must be the focus concerning enhancements, i.e., there may be inequality but is not necessarily a reason not to enhance. We already treat kidneys and hearts as scarce resources that some may get while others may not and we should work to get to a point that it may be available to all but that does not mean that no one gets a kidney until all can. Making a few better lives now may be unequal now but that does not mean we should abandon making those few lives better. It has to start somewhere and throughout history, new technology has started off on an unequal foot with many examples of that changing to be a common good. There is no moral case for delaying access to new technology or health saving device because it is not available to all.
5. Life Extension – life-saving is equivalent to death-postponing. Why do we look at certain methods of life-saving as morally necessary while talking about others as morally disdainful? If postponing death is a good, what about if we could postpone it indefinitely. Harris argues that regenerative medicine may not always be simply therapeutic but it may have an enhancing dimension. He ends this section with a word of caution by stating that we should not tamper with healthy human beings that will harm rather than benefit.

He concludes with a commentary on The Precautionary Principle and Playing God. He notes that UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee has maintained the idea that "...the human genome must be preserved as a common heritage of humanity." He responds with the following rebuttal of their assumptions:
1. The present point in evolution is unambiguously good and not susceptible to improvement.
2. The course of evolution will naturally make things better, not worse.
He views (1) and (2) as incompatible and argues that the common heritage of humanity is the result of evolutionary change. He then appeals to F.M. Cornford to note that if we reject any action on the present on the possibility of future harm, nothing would ever be done the first time to argue against the precautionary principle against enhancement. Lastly, he argues against the "Playing God" argument by noting that medicine can be described as a comprehensive attempt to frustrate the course of nature and therefore God. Artificially changing the nature of nature has led to a change of human nature.

Harris' "Introduction" and "Has Mankind a Future?"

Harris, John (2007). “Introduction” and "Has Humankind a Future?" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1-18.

Harris attempts to answer the question: if the goal of enhanced intelligence, increased capacities, and better health is something we might strive for though education, why should we not strive to produce these goals through other enhancement technologies, including genetic enhancement? He defines enhancement as good if they make us better people. His thesis defends enhancement and argues that not only are enhancement permissible, but that in some cases, there is a positive moral duty to enhance. He briefly appeals to Plato, Marx, Locke, Rousseau, and Bentham to argue that we, as moral agents, have a responsibility to make the world a better place. He notes that we have reached a time in human history at which further attempts to make the world a better place must include changes to the world and humanity. He does not seem to think this is a bad thing and he will show later in the first chapter. He does not think that it is a bad thing that our descendants will not be human in the sense that we now know, but that it is inevitable from an evolutionary point of view or a technological point of view. He thinks that natural selection will be replaced with deliberative selection and Darwinian evolution will be replaced by enhancement evolution. He believes that humans have a moral responsibility to make informed choices for our fate and the fate of the world in which we live along responsibility to make a world a better place. Done correctly, we can take the chance out of evolution and place it within our hands so that change leads to a better species altogether. He seeks to find an ethical way to enhance intelligence, happiness, strength, and life expectancy in ways that protect the safety of people and are consistent with justice, government, and regulation.

He will look at stem cell technology, gene manipulation, embryo selection, drugs, and mechanical enhancements. Harris will also argue against the health and disease models advanced by Boorse and Daniels, which we should review. He argues that the presumption is that citizens should be free to make their own choices in the light of their own values, whether or not these choices and values are acceptable by the majority. He will argue against Michael Sandel, Leon Kass, and Jurgen Habermas who have supported arguments against enhancement. He thinks that choice of phenotypical traits such as hair, eye, and skin color are morally neutral because it is it no worse to be black versus white or blond versus brunette, etc. Harris advocates for research and argues that the fetus is an irredeemably ambiguous entity and not sacred. Research should be regarded not only as desirable but as a positive moral obligation.

He opens up the first chapter by claiming that human enhancement is a good thing and that our genetic heritage is in need of improvement. He also quotes de Lampedusa, "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change." He takes this tact to argue against a conservative position and points out those conservatives who argue against enhancement actually engage in enhancement all the time. He notes that glasses and vaccinations are forms of enhancement – an improvement from what went on before. We enhance in these ways because we are decent, moral people who want to protect each other from harm and benefit ourselves and others. He argues that there is no inherent difference in types of enhancement. The opportunity to create healthier, longer-lived and therefore better lives is a moral responsibility and in the best interest of governments and society.

Harris then appeals to Bertrand Russell's Has Man a Future? to note that we must preserve and expand on what is good in humans, which entails that we should improve in humans over preserving the species in its current form. Harris does not believe that illness and poverty are likely to occur by chance over the thousands of generations evolution requires so any change for the better, based on where we are at as a species, must be up to us. Our potential is in our hands. In this sense, evolution does become something concerning progress and thus becomes teleological. Again, he goes back to the conservative question and argues that we must change at least to preserve, which may mean things cannot remain the same. Shelter, learning, teaching, toll using, farming, social living, and language lend to human enhancement. He argues that genetics will just be next in the list.

Harris does acknowledge that anything listed as historical proof of enhancement has been ill used but that does not discount the overall benefit to humans nor does it entail that we not attempt new technologies for enhancement. Just because something may be used improperly, does not mean that it should be abandoned altogether. Also, just because a new technology may not be available to all is not a good argument to abandon it until it can be. Take writing for example, at one time only a few were allowed to learn and slowly it became available to all. The same with certain antibiotics and electronic technologies. Sometimes technologies that advance are produced slowly. This does not mean that it is unjust or will not be available to all at some point later in the future. Just because it is elitist now does not mean that it always will. He then appeals to Richard Dawkins to warn against a "fetish" of sticking to any one evolutionary stage because any static period in our evolutionary past would entail that humans in our current form would not exist. This will be an argument he uses against Kass, Sandel, Annas, and Fukuyama. Evolution is change so why not embrace it instead of arguing that evolution exists but let's do everything possible to keep it static now. Lastly, he argues that we should take the dangers seriously but without knowledge of how probably or serious the dangers are against the probability and size of the benefits, we have to rational basis for either precaution or enthusiasm. Is ceasing to be human in the way we know now truly problematic?

Glover's “Human Values and Genetic Design”

Glover, Jonathan (2006). “Human Values and Genetic Design” in Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 73-104.

Glover explores philosophical issues surrounding liberty, the harm principle, and human nature as it relates to designing children. He starts with a quote by James Watson, “Most of us are in favor of autonomy … as long as we are not hurting someone else.” (p.73). He then launches into John Stuart Mill and reminds us that according to his political philosophy, “… the only purpose for which power can rightfully exercised over any member of a civilize community, against his will, is to prevent harm to other.” (p. 74). Glover again brings up Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, which states that different policies will shape the world in ways that will lead to different people but that does not mean that they would be worse off than an alternative set of descendents would have been. We may want to explore this idea further because I can imagine a future that is worse off than an alternative set based on bad policy. Would be actually be glad they were born if life is miserable? Maybe some would but others may not, especially if freedom and autonomy are compromised because of bad policy. Glover proposes the idea of ‘transpersonal harm’ to mean one course of action brings about a world where those people exist that are worse off than an alternative set of people, in a alternative future based on different policy so he does recognize that bad choices now can harm those in the future.

The idea of a medical boundary is a more conventional view that claims that intervention is acceptable if it seeks to eliminate disability below a medical standard of what defines disability. As genetic technology advances, this line could change providing an argument that we could have allowed enhancement now, which would be equivalent to treating disability in the future but the problem still remains of who is to decide. He comes back to the idea of human flourishing and advocates the notion that medically defined disability is morally acceptable and that in some cases, non-medical choices may be desirable to promote human flourishing. He also points out that those who advocate only to the medical boundary must specify why that boundary is so special. We should check out Robert Noziak and his idea of the ‘genetic supermarket’.

Glover argues that we should restrict liberty in making genetic choices only when something comparable important to human flourishing is at stake. He suggests that a regulated European model market may allow individual freedom with certain genetic features restricted in the name of public interest. The question then becomes, which choices should be excluded from the democratic debate. Some concerns include:
1. The dangers of uniformity.
2. Genetic inequalities.
3. The possible threat to central parts of human nature.
We recognize that sometimes the value of benefit to the minority justifies inequality. Again, Rawls comes into the picture. The problem here is that inequalities go deeper than economic concerns and are automatically replenished via future generations. The possibility of further class separation is not without merit. Then again, parental acquiensence may minimize inequalities in a reasonable free market. This might not have any effect in overall inequality because as he says, “… parents may all be standing on tiptoe without their children being able to see any better.” (p. 80). He also points out that enhancement for bad reasons may not necessarily entail a child’s harm or regret.

The next section explores definition of human nature. He does worry and argue against any type of state enhancement program as being eugenic. Francis Fukuyama comes up again with his central idea of human dignity and that consciousness, reason, feelings, and the capacity for oral choice must be preserved. Two possible starting points for the exploration of what we value in human nature:
1. The recognition that our nature includes both good and bad qualities.
2. The idea of a good life for human beings.
Glover argues that the first point acknowledging the dark side of human nature might not be subject to elimination through genetic enhancement but rather one of containment if we are to maintain autonomy. He suggests that the best account of a good life comes from an overlap between some version of human flourishing and some version of happiness. He calls this a liberalizing that tends toward convergence. The Darwinian and normal functioning account of human flourishing are too narrow. Humans do not want to do things passively but through experience so the Brave New World scenario must be avoided. The binocular analogy he makes adds depth to the genetic perspective as it relates to:
1. The fit between what you want/value and what your life is like.
2. How rich your life is human goods, what relationships you have with other people, your state of health, autonomy, and scope for creativity.
The hope for shared values then comes from resources of science and subjective experience so essentially an inner and outer view of human experience. As such, a plausible account of human flourishing is unlikely to have one blueprint.

Glover argues that there is a case for optimism in principle and caution in practice. This entails that public debate should continue about known and possible risks but that should not instill paralysis. Lastly, he appeals to the idea of open future to remind us that the future is open to us but that we must leave some of theta openness to the future as well.

Wachbroit's “Normality and the Significance of Difference”

Wachbroit, Robert (2006). “Normality and the Significance of Difference” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 235-53.

Wachbroit argues that current investigations into human genetics do not seem capable of identifying the essential properties of being human. Genetic discoveries will affect our conception, which is directly related to how we understand “normal”. The more we learn about the genetic causal factors of various conditions the more explanatory language will be in genetic terms. What constitutes normality of health will be reassessed medically and socially. Discoveries in the fields of medicine and psychology in relation to genetics will alter out understanding of normality and how we conceptualize others and ourselves. Normality may be defined as:

1. A mathematical concept.
2. An evaluative concept.
3. A biological concept.

Mathematical normality is understood to refer to the mean, median, or mode of a distribution. The Bell Curve, Gaussian distribution, and Normal Curve are roughly equivalent and examples of normality in mathematics. Evaluative normality refers to conventional, cultural, institutional, and ethical norms. Less precise and more subjective than mathematical normality, evaluative norms are often context specific, as one type of behavior in one cultural setting may not be considered normal in another. Biological normality refers to the language that biologists, physicians, or psychologist use to refer to a biological unit such as an organ, a physical reaction, or an environment a person experiences. For example, "You have a normal heart", "Her vital signs were normal", or "He had a normal childhood" all refer to a biological concept of normality.

The biological concept of normality is problematic because it refers to the subjective meaning of 'healthy' and may not point to the average, majority, or ideal. When a physician says that a patient has a normal heart she is not referring to the average heart because that is epistemologically impossible. Secondly, when a psychologist determines that someone had a normal childhood, it does not point to a specific home environment but rather a healthy one, which may or may not realistically reflect the majority of home environments. Lastly, when an optometrist says that a person has normal vision she is not appealing to ideal vision, which may be closer to that of a fighter pilot. Behavioral concepts of normality also suffer from subjective meaning and are contextually problematic related to definitions of average, majority, or ideal. Lastly, not always do statistical, social, and biological understandings coincide although advances in science can shorten the gap in some cases. They are three categories of meaning, not three different meanings.

Why different parts of an organism evolve the way it does (Wright) or whether function is to be understood in terms of the organism’s overall ability to survive and reproduce (Boorse) will affect one’s conception of biological normality. When applied to behavior, we may actual redefine the type of behavior under examination, which may affect the social meaning of the term normal. Like Press, Wachbroit refers to medicalization of behavior as problematic within the context of normality because of the conflation of social and biological meanings. He points to education of the public of the distinction so that conflation is minimized. He shows that Fukuyama’s defintion of human nature conflates the distinction. His definition of human nature allows for change over time in case of disease or medical advances but Wachbroit rejects a changing view of what it means to be human. He concludes by asking the question, which is relevant to our research, whether something is human nature if there is 51% or more of a genetic component versus something that is 49% genetic in nature? Does the environmental factors of causation have anything to do with human nature?

Duster's "Behavioral Genetics and Crime, Violence, and Race"

Duster, Troy (2006). “Behavioral Genetics and Explanations of the Link between Crime, Violence, and Race” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 150-75.

Duster argues that scrutiny and skepticism should be employed in behavioral genetic research because of the trend to more between population differentials and the socially constructed bias of the criminal justice system. Lewontin commented on statistical problems related to comparing within group variance and between group variance related to the IQ controversy of the 1970s. The problem here lies within the idea that humans share 99.9% of identical DNA and research that tries to correlate genetic ancestry with behaviors such as violence, criminality, and impulsivity. Like Press, he appeals to the notion of social constructionism as it relates to behavior. Many researchers also argue that physical variations in the human species have no meaning except the social ones we create, which have no constancy. “Race” can have a substantial effect on how people behave but that does entail a link to genetic causation. If, however, researchers initiate research based on certain trends such as the disproportionate number of African Americans incarcerated compared to the general population, then run the risk of making invalid conclusions similar to the “science” of phrenology in the late 19th century. He does argue that we should eliminate racial and ethnic classifications in the routine collection and analysis of data but rather that we need to recognize, engage, and clarify the complexity of interaction between taxonomies of race and genetic outcomes.

I agree with his idea of the Zeitgeist or spirit of the time in conducting research because we must accept that, in many ways, we are products of our environment and societies as much as we are products of our genome. Duster provides a slew of evidence to back up his claim that we may want to revisit. He also speaks to the circular nature of labeling theory in hat he terms a “looping effect”. This will be especially important related to ASPD and the MAOA connection. Then again, in the context of drug treatment, is genetic “profiling” to eliminate disability really a bad thing? He sites cystic fibrosis and beta-thallosemia as examples of ethnic or group specific diseases that may warrant research. The important difference is that of a physical disorder and that of behavior but this does not address the question of whether physicalism or genetics gives rise to behavior. He also speaks of the difference between genetic markers and explanatory causation of crime that we will have to keep in mind.

Brock's “Behavioral Genetics and Equality”

Brock, Dan W. (2006). “Behavioral Genetics and Equality” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 220-34.

Brock argues that the there is not a moral objection to enhancement technologies but to selective access to them in ways that would exacerbate social, moral, and economic inequalities. The future holds the possibility that many natural differences in life and well being may become more into our control but not without the risk that moral, social, and economic inequality would increase. How much of class structure is based on heredity and wouldn’t any new medical or genetic treatment related to enhancement necessarily be outside the purview of anyone but the rich? Many may think that significant enhancement technology is science fiction but the notion of increasing inequality is not a far stretch. He discusses social justice and distinguishes between formal and fair equality appealing to Rawls to claim that fair equality of opportunity requires equal opportunities of those similarly endowed and motivated. Rawls may argue for physical enhancement behind the veil of ignorance but not for enhancement available to a select group of individuals in the society giving them unfair advantage over the rest. Ask Jim why he claims that diversity and idiosyncrasy would diminish in such a state when he argues for the potentiality of an increased gap. I thought he made a rather poignant analogy to the dismal quality of public education in the U.S and opportunity for individuals in that lower income group. He comments on the difference between brute luck and option luck to claim that our current system accepts bad brute luck but not bad option luck. The point is that bad brute luck may only be available to a few further inequitizing society thereby being an issue of injustice.

Brock argues that the value of traits change over time due to the social, political, economic, and I argue technological framework of society. How do we decide what traits will be of value in an unknowable future? Take height. There seems to be cultural value to being thin and tall but that could change. History shows us that women with more curves were more sought after than thin women. The idea of equalizing is not feasible because that means that we would have to de-enhance those with extraordinary ability but enhancing based on cultural values that may change is not in the long run equalizing natural assets. It may be fine motor skills that are of value today ad brute strength tomorrow. I find it interesting that he withholds speculation on the potential for inequality simply within the context of preventing genetic disease. He agrees that limiting the use of genetic technology will be difficult because of the complexity of positional and intrinsic value to cases of benefit to the individual and society. What if we could make firefighters stronger with more stamina? It still comes down to where do we draw the line. He concludes with a discussion of human nature, dignity, and evolution arguing that it would be problematic to sustain a moral community or democratic institution that respected the human rights of all. He speaks of a natural aristocracy that might develop. Would we not look at this as an instance if speciation, which still begs the question of what is it that makes us human.

Press' "Social Constructionism and Medicalization"

Press, Nancy (2006). “Social Construction and Medicalization” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 131-49.

Press argues that behavioral genetics depends on traits, concepts, and phenotypes that may not be the product of nature but socially constructed and therefore inconstant phenomena. This does not allow for the construct validity needed for natural inquiry and could lead the field astray with negative social consequences. Social constructionism is the idea that the traits under question have a social or environmental basis. Medicalization helps construct and reify the behaviors under which behavior geneticists engage. It can also refer to the increasing number of aspects of life that are being brought under the purview of medicine thereby making medicine more of a social force in social constructionism. Geneticization describes the extension of medicalization to the genetic realm. She attempts to get to the heart if universal versus localized traits and it’s link to genetic research. Do traits have to be universal to have a valid genetic component or is this more of the “gloomy prospect” applied to group? Her claim that it is possible to undertake a biographical investigation of a social construct speaks to the Husserlean idea of presuppositionlessness but that is also problematic. Can behavior ever be reduced away from the micro or macrocosm of the environment? My thoughts are that it might be possible in some cases. She may be onto something concerning universals but what about reexamining a “universal” within a cultural context? That would address her concern that culture dictates what we research but it does raise the issues of “What is believed to be true about behavior affects the very behavior which it purports to explain”. (Eisenberg, 1988, 145)

Press speaks to the way science should work against a holistic view that local interactions lend support. Ask Jim about the trend to be interdisciplinary with academic research. Would this not speak to a more holistic view of causation? The problem is that we cannot extract ourselves from within the social construct we are living and this is a difficulty with the scientific method we employ, the conclusions we make, and the very questions, as Press points out, we ask about human behavior. We have to remember to take a look at the possible difficulties with the DSM-IV and its susceptibility to social constructionism. It seems that Press thinks that psychiatry is more grounded in physicalism than psychology but the distinction and difficulties will be important when we start drawing the line based on APA criteria. We will also have to reference the idea of health as a status symbol in addition to normative language. I agree that medicalization and social constructionism surrounding traits in question may lead researchers astray but the question is how much is this a factor or does it depend on the trait in question as we seems to be heading for our project. I more strongly agree that the conclusions of genetic study have a impact on perception of behavior in society and that we are working along a continuum where we draw the line viz. “no bright line” is drawn”.

The last part of the essay speak to research with low rates of probability of success because of the aforementioned difficulties but what if the genetics drove the cultural norm in the first place. The debate for the evolutionary basis of altruism continues and it is here that we may or may not be able to tease apart nature versus nurture. She references Turkheimer and her slightly more positive take on the gloomy hypothesis. Last thought: she makes the distinction between smoking behavior and lung cancer as a focus for research as an example of medicalization but didn’t the research on the disease of lung cancer lead to a social construct that smoking is harmful and undesirable thereby pointing a reciprocal relationship between physical inquiry and social constructs? Hasn’t that been a good thing that we socially frown on smoking than we did 20 years ago or is that just my own perspective on the matter due to my own relationship to and within my society?

Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Screening for Complex Behavioral Traits

In addition to Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics (Parens, 2006), the following books are next on the list to read and work through fro my UROP project with Jim. After we rough up an idea for a thesis today, I need to spend some time in the library researching the most current journal articles n the subject. Are we pointing in the direction of causation and behavior or will we more or less accept the tenants of genetic links to behavior and argue for drawing a line somewhere between treatment and enhancement? Will we focus on ASPD that probably has the most social relevance and potential for arguments in the realm of policy or more in the medical arena for traits such as depression that may have more medical implications?

Enhancing Evolution – Harris argues that we are morally obligated to enhance but how does factor into intervention on the behalf of others, i.e., children. He appeals to political and moral philosophers such as Bentham, Rousseau, Locke, and Russell. He seems to argue against the model for health and disease proposed by Boorse and Daniels. He speaks to arguments of sufficient seriousness, sufficient probability, and proximity to justify human freedom.

Choosing Children – Glover argues that in order to make the claim that enhancement will minimize or eliminate disability, we must first understand and define disability. Also, how are we to ethically argue for the elimination of certain disabilities such as deafness? This is especially relevant when many in the deaf community do not view deafness as a disability. I think the disability component will be good to explore since the question of normality and possible dichotomous relationship between disability and enhancement. It also appears that he tries to distinguish between the rights of parents and the right of children in addition to arguing that there should be constraints on parental choice. He seems to tackle the idea of a modern eugenics with an emphasis on what enhancement means to notions of justice and genetic competitiveness. Based on the introduction and skimming, he seems to argue for intervention and the redrawing of the line to push the envelope of “normal” while arguing against enhancement that leads to societal inequities.

From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice – Buchanan et al. offer a systematic analysis of issues surrounding genetic technology, ethics, and social policy. Published in 2000, it may start to date itself except for the arguments on more timeless philosophical issues of justice and human nature. While the history of eugenics leading up to Nazi Germany is important, it seems that there was a case to be made for the existence of a form of modern eugenics before completion of the human genome project so if we move in a positive direction, maybe we should not shy away from the past but embrace a redefinition that incorporates ethics, social theory, and learning from the past. Just an idea … not quite sure if it’s a good one. It seems that the Buchanan essays are more relevant to our research but we should selectively read arguments by the other authors including those concerning:
1. Distributive justice
2. Human nature and bases of inequality
3. Normality
4. Tailoring environments
5. Moral boundaries
6. Treatment versus enhancement
7. Egalitarianism
8. Normal function model
9. The idea of “best”
10. The right to an open future
11. Reproductive freedom

Schaffner's "Behavior: Its Nature and Nurture Pt. 1"

Schaffner, Kenneth F (2006). “Behavior: Its Nature and Nurture, Part 1” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-39.

Schaffner attempts to provide an overview of various concepts of behavioral causation with an emphasis on explaining the genetic component. The following are thoughts and questions that may help piece together the puzzle to ultimately form a thesis concerning ethical issues of genetic screening for complex behavioral traits. This is more like free association but its purpose is to get thoughts out. How does moral relativism play into our discussion? Schaffner speaks to genetic and environmental causation but how do psychological factors play into the equation? What about behavior as a phenomenological factor rather than a trait? By calling behavior a trait, are we not presupposing a form of reductionism to genetics? In more touchy-feely language, am I not more than what my genetics, environment, and a G x E interaction dictate? We need to check out Rawls? He is used as an argument for genetic enhancement and intervention. Hat is the effect of environment on evolution? What about environmental heritability? How will w divide up quantitative versus molecular approaches to behavioral genetics? Schizophrenia too genetic to study? Depression too environmental? We may want to stick with ASPD due to the link to criminality. We may also want to explore thresholds of risk to help draw the line if we are not going to reject any intervention or enhancement?

In the first dialogue, Schaffner appeals to Lewontin on red blood cell phosphatase activity to explain environmental and genetic variation. He mentions on pp. 13 a study in which all phenotypic variation is due to environmental factors. What about Stotz’s claim that the gene also acts as an environment, i.e., what is the effect of the rest of the genome on the trait? Have Jim show you the math concerning the heritability of having a brain being zero (pp. 16). We need to explore problems with the equal environment assumption if we are to argue against the benefit of genetic testing o n ASPD. What is the best argument for behavior being genetically linked (broad)? The problem with the fearful mice experiment is that what if a mouse ate some bad cheese and had diarrhea? Would it be classified as fearful? How to distinguish?

Rowe and Jacobson (1999) developed criteria for factors deemed shared environmental effect
1. Near universals in culture do not count.
2. Environmental exposure must be common to all siblings.
3. The environmental exposure must have directional effect on the trait in question.
4. The environmental exposure must change the trait in a constant direction in order for it to be shared.

Problem with (1) if environment does have an effect on gene frequency. Problem with (2) is that how do you define common experience? Problem with (3, 4) is how do you tease out other effects (both genetic and environmental)? Even Schaffner realizes this difficulty since he places this idea as a “term of art”. He seems to agree with the “gloomy prospect” of possibly never being able to tease out environmental effects in the narrow, non-shared sense. Has anyone looked at DNA from 100 years ago compared to now? If there is a significant difference (problems with qualifying significance) would that not point to environmental inheritance or would it be argued as genetic? Problems with models. What the simplest and most complex model for behavioral genetics?

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part IV

Part III lists all questions and comments raised to date from original posts and replies in Part I and II. So far, Dr. Jason Epps, my friend and colleague (hopefully to remain as such), has been the only person to pose such responses; therefore, my comments and questions are directed mostly to what I discern to be his position favoring Creationism over the claims of science concerning evolution. I will provide a brief treatment of epistemological issues raised thus far and then speak, mostly by reference, to some science questions raised.

The Distinction between Science and Faith
So far, the attempt has been made to place science and faith on the same playing field regarding what kind of knowledge they provide and the manner in which belief functions. In other words, the claim is that faith is ultimately common to both science and faith. Respectively, this is both simplistic and fallacious. There is not just one category of belief nor is there just one form of knowledge. Belief in God, belief that I will be killed if I play on the freeway, belief that I am not just a brain in a vat, and belief in the Big Bang Theory of the Universe are different categories of belief that provide different types of knowledge. I am not saying anything new here; many epistemologists have recognized this for centuries. For a more complete treatment of this idea, one may refer to an introductory text in epistemology such as Morton’s Theory of Knowledge (2002). If you would like a theological treatment of faith, reason, inference, and assent you may refer to Cardinal John Henry Newman’s A Grammar in Aid of Assent (1870). Newman’s work is especially relevant regarding the difference between inference and faith.

In regards to science, inference is used to make claims that have yet to be empirically proven. For example, the Big Bang Theory was inferred from the observation that the universe seems to be expanding. The inference is that if the visible universe is currently expanding then it was smaller in the past. Taken back far enough the inference leads to an extremely dense, hot singularity and an event that is known as the Big Bang. This is not faith. It is based on observations that can be replicated. Inference is more flexible to revision than faith because new observations are a different kind of evidence than what faith may require for change. Reason and observation are all that is required to produce an inference. Faith is much more complex and requires intuition and affect in addition to reason. Faith, unlike inference, does not always require direct observation. Another difference between inference and faith is that faith is not simply a belief; it requires volition of action for coherency. Inference, unlike faith, may never affect daily life. Quite simply, faith points to a different kind of truth and knowledge than inference points to associated with science. So, if one is truly interested in discovering truth, the choices after appeal to or replication of observations become:

1. Deny the observations that lead to inference because of difficulties associated with empiricism.
2. Offer an alternative inference. This leads to the formulation of a theory that may be tested to either reject or refine that theory.

Option (1) is problematic because if you reject all observation and experience then one may fall into deep skepticism, which should also apply to one’s own position and leads nowhere meaningful. Skepticism helps keep claims to knowledge rigorous but when taken too far, like most things, is not helpful or practical. Therefore, the question then becomes what observations are reasonable to accept in propositions and inference. Who decides what to accept and what to reject? My observation of the Creationist position, thus far, is that observations that lend support to a position contrary to their own or that supports a theory with implications contrary to their own is many times rejected outright. Does this aid in the search for objective knowable truth or is it simply easier to ignore the tough questions that entail from observations of the physical world?

I think Option (2) is much more interesting and at the heart of what any debate related to coherency should address. The problem, however, still comes back to the demarcation problem. There are exceptions and some difficulties with verifiability and testability but these two qualities seem to provide what Creationism and I.D. do not. If one infers God, is one still practicing science? Maybe yes but on only two questions related to prima causa:

1. How did matter come into existence in the first place?
2. How did the first nucleotide or lipid necessary for even a simple Eukaryotic cell come into existence in the first place?

After those first two moments in time (and maybe not even then), no appeal to God, the supernatural, or anything non-naturalistic should be made for it remain science. Why? Because science and religion serve two separate, distinct functions in human society and are categorically different, not opposing ends of a spectrum. To change science or religion to function in a similar manner as the other defeats the type of knowledge that may be discovered from its distinct, respective position. I simply do not understand why many (but not all) in the religious community want them to be the same thing. If they are the same, do the same epistemological difficulties apply to their position as well? Some argue that the push to get science and religion on the same playing field is part of a larger sociopolitical agenda to get prayer back into the classroom at the expense of all that we have gained over the last 300 years. It is easy to see why when you have action plans such as the Wedge Strategy associated with Philip Johnson, author of Darwin on Trial. One of the purposes of this blog is to explore the characteristics that make science distinct so I encourage asking the tough question of “What is Science?” and posting what qualities you feel science should possess that are distinct from religion. Also, check out the websites for the Center for Scientific Creation and The Discovery Institute to make up your own mind on the larger issue of evolution … just don’t look for many citations without a last name of Behe, Dembski, or Meyer.

A Few Replies and a Comment on Science
I must begin by stating that this exercise has shown me how much more science I need to learn. I have 3 years of Biochemistry, 1 year of Physics, 1 year of Genetics, 2 quarters of Zoology, 1 semester of Philosophy of Genetics, and 1 semester of Science & Society under my belt (all college level). I am also a big fan of the History Channel, Animal Planet, TLC, and the Discovery Channel. Lastly, I have read a decent amount of hard science on my own including Brian Greene’s Elegant Universe, Michio Kaku’s Parallel Worlds, Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History in Time and Universe in a Nutshell. I am not listing this to brag; my purpose is actually quite the contrary. The type of knowledge science provides is so vast that to answer all the specific questions in a particular field is rather difficult and upon reflection, I should have done more to increase my knowledge of the natural world to be able to more eloquently answer the questions posed in this blog. As such and in regards to the questions of evolution and other scientific questions raised, I recommend checking out and defer to TalkOrigins because they provide answers to these types of questions and more with many citations to source materials. They respond to but do not present Creationist or I.D. positions but provide numerous links to alternative views including Creationism and I.D. websites here. As with any Internet resource, be skeptical and judge for yourself. I have a few replies to specific questions and comments raised so far.

*** “Big Bang theory posits that at some point, there was nothing that somehow became something.” ***
This misrepresents the theory. The inference for the theory leads back to an extremely dense, hot singularity. This allows for many things including a cyclical beginning and end to the universe due to black holes or God. Stephen Hawking and Brian Greene do not posit the idea of something from nothing. Neither my physics book nor anything I researched on the web claimed something from nothing either. I am interested in a citation for your claim. Hawking and Greene do acknowledge the difficulty of the prima causa for creation of matter in purely naturalistic terms.

*** “When has “mutability” been observed?” ***
See TalkOrigins on Five Major Misconceptions about Evolution regarding direct and indirect evidence observable in the here and now. Any basic biology or evolutionary biology text should also provide examples.

*** “There is still no observable evidence for transmutability. I would challenge anyone reading this blog to produce it. If you can’t produce it, then you have to concede that there is a significant measure of “faith” that is involved in accepting evolution – as much as it might hurt to admit it :0) ” ***
Once again, either you are rejecting the abundance of observations that lead to this inference or you are not doing your homework. Many transitional fossils have been found that lend support to an inference of transmutability between species and genera, between families, genera, and classes, and between kingdoms and phyla. Check out the TalkOrigins link here for a brief treatment regarding such evidence. I also suggest reading the full article entitled Transitional Vertebrates Fossils FAQ. Your challenge has been produced, no concessions to faith given, and no hurt felt, thank you very much. Do you claim that all these observations are a hoax or do not exist? If not, what inferences would you make with the data? I highly recommend checking this section out because it addresses the misconception of extreme transmutability that has been raised such as transmutation of a frog to a cow or fish to a man. I found the idea fascinating that such extreme mutability is actually evidence against evolution.

A few more questions:
1. What is an evolutionist? If I believe in coherency between faith and religion, what is my label? How would one categorize Francis Collins? He is Director of the Human Genome Project and Evangelical Christian. He believes that evolution is not only real but also evidence of God.

2. How can evolution be coherent with the idea of Biblical inerrancy? Is the Bible a guide to the physical, spiritual, or both? If it is a physical guide then how does it help answer modern questions of medicine, biology, or physics that were inconceivable roughly 2000 years ago?

3. If the message of the Bible refers to an immaterial soul, how are morality and meaning affected by evolution, a material process?

4. What specifically does treatment of science with epistemological integrity look like or entail?

5. What are the 700 dissenters who claim, “We are skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life? Careful examination of the evidence for Darwinian theory should be encouraged.” actually saying? It does not seem to denounce evolution but calls for skepticism and careful examination of evidence, which no scientist would (or should) disagree. See Jason’s blog on the subject here for the specific document.

I appreciate the comments and questions so far. I think Socrates had it right when he argued that the way to truth involves pursuing thought in many directions and to follow out logical implications of thought. It makes us uncomfortable to challenge our own positions but drives those who truly seek truth to continue to work and discover. I do not understand how Creationism or I.D. allows for the possibility of further work to discover the many unanswered questions; however, I am open (and still waiting) for answers to analytically evaluate. Only in this way may objective truth may be discovered and therefore become knowable.

As always, respectful comments are encouraged.

Best Wishes,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part III

Here are all of the questions and comments raised in Part I and II. If I missed anything, it was not my intent. Please leave a post detailing any errors so I may update.

Questions Raised to Date

1. Are strict adherents to either side interested in civil conversation?

2. Should the debate be under the label of “science”? Why or why not?

3. How is science defined?

4. How does Intelligent Design not fall prey to a regress that concludes with an entity we traditionally define as God?

5. What does a basic definition of evolution need to consist of?

6. Does this definition go beyond Darwin's understanding in "Origin?”

7. How many dissenters of the theory constitute a significant amount?

8. What do you mean by "accredited scientist”?

9. If the dissenters of the theory from #7 above make a supernatural conclusion, are they still practicing science?

10. Who has the burden of proof and why?

11. Is the burden of proof to show that evolution or intelligent design or creation is right, wrong, or that one is science and that one is not?

12. If the moral and Biblical implications of evolution are intolerable to so many of faith, is reconciliation, debate, coherency, or any other unifying word even possible?

13. Big Bang theory posits that at some point, there was nothing that somehow became something. Why is it that this belief considered science when it is plainly not naturalistic or empirically observed?

14. When has “mutability” been observed? Variation within species has certainly been observed, but when has “transmutation?” If we haven’t then why refer to this as science? If you can’t observe it in the present, in a lab for example, doesn’t that case to be science? Or does that line of reasoning apply only to those who believe in God?

15. How many evolutionists would adhere to the recent finding that the universe had a beginning?

Comments and Difficulties Raised to Date

A. Certain words and concepts need to be clearly and concisely defined if any productive conversation is to take place.

B. There needs to be a clear-cut statement of belief for Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design.

C. Science should be systematic and not appeal to supernatural causation.

D. Religion and science, once you carry them back far enough, are both based upon faith.

E. Just as religion, science is based upon ultimate foundations that cannot be empirically verified.

F. The debate should not be under the label of “science” because I.D. and Creationism appeal to the supernatural and lack a methodology for further research. It would be acceptable for the debate to be under Philosophy, Sociology, or Education.

G. Current mainstream science appeals to the supernatural just as much as creation science does. If it did not, it would have no foundation upon which to rest its evolutionary conclusions.

H. Intelligent Design is equivalent to God and is simply a tactic around the Supreme Court ban on the teaching of Creationism in public schools.

I. Related to # 4 above. A regress presupposes that the ultimate Intelligent Designer is subject to the natural order that He created and exists outside of. This is illogical. God created the physical order of things that includes reason, logic, time, space, and laws. The idea that a creation must have a Creator is valid in the order that God created but it makes little sense to suppose that He is subject to rules that He created for a reality where He does not primarily “reside.”

J. There is still no observable evidence for transmutability. If evidence cannot be provided then there is a significant measure of “faith” that is involved in accepting evolution.

K. “That evolution is” versus “how evolution is” are two separate questions.

L. Under 1% of working earth and life scientists in the United States dissent with the theory of evolution.

M. Majority has absolutely nothing to do with truth. Most people thought Galileo was an idiot but the overwhelming majority was overwhelmingly wrong.

N. Related to L above. These are two different studies. You are committing a fallacy by combining the two to draw a conclusion. Your conclusion implies that the 700 dissenting scientists are the ONLY scientists who disagree of question the “absoluteness” of evolutionary theory.

O. Let’s make sure science treats its subjects with epistemological integrity.

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part II

The following is a comment I made 5/31/2008 to the post "The Coherency of Evolution and Faith"(5/29/2008). It was requested that I make this its own post so as requested ....

Upon reflection on this issue, I believe many related questions must be answered to even envision what the debate should look like so I’m going to ask a few of those questions and leave the first substantive commentary to Mario (or anyone else for that matter). These are in no particular order.

1. Should the debate be under the label of “science”? If you think yes, then why? If you think, no then under what label and why?

2. Can someone please outline an argument for me how Intelligent Design does not fall prey to a regress that concludes with an entity we traditionally define as God?

3. The following is a basic definition that I pulled from Wikipedia (5/30/2008): “In biology, evolution is the process of change in the inherited traits of a population of organisms from one generation to the next. The genes that are passed on to an organism's offspring produce the inherited traits that are the basis of evolution. Mutations in genes can produce new or altered traits in individuals, resulting in the appearance of heritable differences between organisms, but new traits also come from the transfer of genes between populations, as in migration, or between species, in horizontal gene transfer. In species that reproduce sexually, new combinations of genes are produced by genetic recombination, which can increase the variation in traits between organisms. Evolution occurs when these heritable differences become more common or rare in a population.”

I used Wikipedia because it seems to be a basic source for basic definitions and nothing in this definition seems out of line with my understanding of the basic tenants of the theory. What more is required for a meaningful debate to take place?

4. If there are 480,000 accredited, University affiliated earth and life scientists working in the United States alone, how many dissenters of the theory constitute a significant amount?

5. If the dissenters of the theory from #4 above make a supernatural conclusion, are they still practicing science?

6. Who has burden of proof and why?

7. If the moral and Biblical implications of evolution (regardless of the observations, inferences, or argument) are intolerable to so many of faith, is reconciliation, debate, coherency, or any other unifying word even possible?

I hope we get some meaningful dialogue to answer these and many more to come. I will try to work out my answers to my own questions … unless Battlestar Galactica is on, of course.

Cheers,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part I

If we assume that evolutionary theory points to a certain kind of truth and that faith also points to a certain kind of truth then it is only logical that there must be a certain kind of coherency between the theory of evolution and faith. Naturalism as a metaphysical worldview versus God seems to be the boiled-down, line-in-the-sand issue, not mutability of species as the basic, basic tenant of evolutionary theory. Too bad we couldn’t put representatives from both camps in a cage match, let them fight it out, and be done with the conflict, bickering, name-calling, hypocrisy, and tactics that take place on both sides of the fence. Since we cannot do a cage match … as cool as that might be … what would it take from both sides to resolve this debate? Maybe all I can hope for in this post is formulation of questions that must be answered before resolution can be achieved but I am truly interested in thoughtful, respectful solutions.

So … what do you think?

Best Wishes,
Roger

Darwin, Science, and the Demarcation Problem

Our study of Darwin’s theory of evolution, its aftermath, and implications unsurprisingly begs as many questions as it answers. One of the biggest questions related to the study of the theory involves epistemic and presuppositional difficulties of science. To resolve these difficulties first requires a definition of science, which relates to what is called the demarcation problem. I will make a few brief comments on the demarcation problem but leave the majority of its treatment to my friend Mario, a much wiser philosopher than I.

The demarcation problem in the philosophy of science concerns the boundary between science, and everything else. In other words, it asks the question what is science and what is not science? One version of the problem concerns the boundary between science and pseudo-science. Advocates of pseudo-science claim that it should be on the same playing field as science even though it does not function in the same way. The difficulty and resolution of demarcation lies within the criterion used to distinguish science from pseudo or non-science.

The term “science” is socially significant because it seems to make a claim on a certain type of knowledge or truth. Some argue that this leads to preferential access to money, policy, and security within educational institutions. As such, the demarcation problem and its resolution significantly affects our definition of social justice and what is taught to children in public schools.

Good philosophy should present difficulties of claims made in an argument as part of its treatment. As it relates to science, keep in mind that some propositions could be true and have nothing to do with scientific formulation or considerations. In addition, we may still intend science to be a truth-seeking activity or a better way of arriving at true beliefs but it does not entail that scientific claims are always true.

Please stay tuned to this post as I have a feeling the debate will be more than interesting. Well, hopefully.

Best Wishes,
Roger

Herschel's "The Study of Natural Philosophy"

Herschel, John. "The Study of Natural Philosophy", 1830. In Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3rd ed., edited by Philip Appleman, 49-57. New York: W.W Norton & Company, Inc., 2001.

This piece seems to refer back to Hume's Problem of Induction but allows for observation and inference as long as it does not conflict with the Bible. Here are the main points:

1. Humans are speculative beings. We contemplate the world and objects around us not with passive indifference but as a system of order and design.
2. No natural object unimportant or trifling to the natural philosopher.
3. The natural philosopher seeks to determine the operation of general causes to describe general laws.
4. Principles not phenomena, laws not insulated facts, are the object and inquiry of the natural philosopher.
5. All human discoveries seem to be made only for the purpose of confirming more strongly the truths contained in sacred writings such as the Bible.

Vera causa, induction, and presuppositions again resurface as issues of science. Herschel agreed with Darwin that observations support Darwin's Principle of Divergence but he disagreed with Darwin conclusions because the implications so clearly departed from the Bible, especially in regards to humans. I think Herschel was looking for naturalistic answers to scientific inquiry that fit with God's word.

Herschel sought one truth, not two possible truths. For many people today, it is a choice between two dichotomies, not a quest to find the truth of two worldviews. We will explore this more as we go but one question I will continue to explore is why does evolution preclude design, intelligence, or God as prima causa? Why does the Book of Genesis have to be interpreted as a statement of biology versus a statement of our spirit, soul, or immaterial self as being in the image of God? After all, black people and white people look prima facie distinct, as do men and women. So, what image of God is the correct image or does Genesis simply imply a dualistic human nature of body and soul?

Lyell's "Principles of Geology"

Lyell, Charles. "Principles of Geology", 1830-33. In Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3rd ed., edited by Philip Appleman, 49-52. New York: W.W Norton & Company, Inc., 2001.

Norton Critical editions contain abridged excerpts from source texts so we rely somewhat on the discretion of the editor for arguments and observations to critique. It has been pointed out that Appleman is not a scientist but a poet and English Professor. Must one be a scientist to legitimately comment on science? What defines a scientist? Is it adherence to philosophical or methodological naturalism? I will attempt to answer these questions over the course of the project but already, getting to the truth seems to be a messy endeavor. These questions are relevant to critiques of evolutionary theory as well. Philip Johnson, author of Darwin on Trial and prominent critic of evolutionary theory, is a Law Professor from Berkeley. He is also a founder of the Intelligent Design Movement and architect of the Wedge Strategy. Does this make his argument against evolution any less valid? I briefly mentioned presuppositions in my prior post. How do we not color our reasoning and arguments with bias to legitimize our conclusions? I have provided more questions than answers here but this may be a great way to start this project. Skepticism should be the default position of science ... maybe non-scientists ought to approach it the same way. Oh yeah, the link on the Wedge Strategy is from Wikipedia. As with all things Wiki, I encourage further reference and understanding that at best, Wikipedia only provides a broad definition, not a definitive one and not everyone agrees on even the broad definitions. OK, onto to Lyell.

Here are the main points and observations from Principles of Geology:

1. He references Lamarck and Cuvier to the progress of geological understanding of the fossil record. Lamarck believed that the fossil record indicated that species diverged from the original but not that species went extinct. This supported more of an old earth view that was rejected by Cuvier and the scientific community of the time. Cuvier was a catastrophist who believed in the fixity of species and extinction.
2. Lyell refers to rock formation (volcanic) and strata as evidence of an old earth and, "... tranquil deposition of sedimentary matter, and the slow development of organic life.” (49).
3. He seems to refer to modern continental theory that the continents were at one time a single land mass (Pangaea). The excerpt does not refer to Pangaea directly, only that continents grow. Is this a reference to erosion, volcanic action, and continental drift?
4. He does acknowledge an "Eternal Being" and refers to design and unity of purpose.
5. He does not think that the "finite powers of Man" will allow even speculation of the truth regarding the beginning or end of so vast a scheme (geology and biology?).

Lyell was one of the biggest influences on Darwin. He was given Volume I of Lyell's work by Captain Fitzroy on the Beagle soon after departure from England. Darwin sent for Volume II later on in the voyage. Lyell's work and the concept of an old earth is important to Darwin's theory because, generally speaking, natural selection requires vast amounts of time. Evidence of a roughly 6,000-year-old earth as posited by some religious groups would be a difficulty for evolutionary theory even though they would still have to answer the question of genetic drift and mutation. Does anyone know of the best evidence that supports a young earth outside of an appeal to the Bible?

I am curious to know of the best modern evidence of an old earth. Carbon dating? Tectonic plate theory? Paleontology? This also seems to relate to modern astronomical/cosmological theory.

Darwin Group - Goals and Purpose

This summer, I am involved in a Darwin discussion group. The purpose of this group is to explore the science behind Darwin, Darwin's actual writings, and the aftermath of Origin of Species. The impact of Darwin touches many aspects of modern science and life. I have some educational experience in chemistry, biochemistry, genetics and biology while other members of the group do not. Some of the members have taken a Philosophy of Genetics class but the course did not deal directly with evolutionary arguments. My goal is to work through the science to judge the strength of evolutionary arguments to better respond to questions concerning the teaching of evolution in public schools, the Intelligent Design debate, and what seems to be a religious anti-evolutionary view. I want to be clear that I do not think that just because you go to church on Sunday that you must automatically reject evolutionary thought. However, the religious implications of the theory and the general religious and/or conservative party line (for lack of better words) is a real conflict that has not been resolved since the time of Lamarck, almost 200 years ago. Lamarck published Zoological Philosophy in 1809, was a early proponent of evolution, and was attacked by the scientific and religious community of the time for suggesting that species were not fixed or as Darwin would later call it, subject to variation according to the Principle of Divergence.

I will come back to this subject from time to time and encourage your respectful comments. Regardless of your feelings on the matter, it is a controversy, passions run high on the issue, and arguments for reconciliation seem remote. If this is of interest to you, I would also recommend checking out Tough Questions a blog run by Dr. Jason Epps who is a both a friend and colleague of philosophy. He also happens to have a doctorate in Theology and is Pastor of Gospel Fellowship Church. Jason is much more prolific with his writing/blogging than I and teaching me to be more analytical and critical in all of my work in philosophy. I'm sure our debates this summer will center on epistemological difficulties and the question and definition of "What is Science?" He and I may have different presuppositions going into this project but we are both interested in getting a little a closer to the truth. Stay tuned to both blogs and let's see how we fare in that pursuit.

If you are interested in following along with the reading ...
Appleman, Philip, ed. Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3^rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. ISBN: 0-393-95849-3